We present a logic for Proximity-based Understanding of Conditionals (PUC-Logic) that unifies the Counterfactual and Deontic logics proposed by David Lewis. We also propose a natural deduction system (PUC-ND) associated to this new logic. This inference system is sound, complete, normalizing and decidable.
I. COUNTERFACTUALS
Since the 1990's , J. Halpern and Y. Moses showed how the use of counterfactuals helps to a better support for reasoning in what they call knowledge-based programs. These programs were originally proposed to provide high-level framework for the design and specification of protocols. They are an attempt to capture the intuition that what an agent does depends on what it knows. There are many articles reporting the success and benefits of counterfactuals in performing this task. Many of these articles report success cases of experiments done in the 1990's, by the research group led by Halpern and Moses, even before any explicit use of counterfactuals. In 2004, these authors provided examples showing that the use of counterfactuals can exhibit counterintuitive behavior. We assume the working hypothesis that Natural Deduction can provide better understanding of the reasons the conclusion logically follows from the assumptions in a formal derivation. From this working hypothesis it is quite desirable to have a Natural Deduction system for counterfactuals. We chose firstly to have this for Lewis counterfactuals, since they are the most well-known of this kind.
"If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over, seems to me to mean something like this: in any possible state of affairs in which kangaroos have no tails, and which resembles our actual state of affairs as much as kangaroos having no tails permits it to, the kangaroos topple over." [1] We can observe that the word "resemble" may be seen as a reference to the concept of similarity between some possible state of affairs in relation to the actual state of affairs. The expression "as much as" here may be understood as a relative comparison of similarities among the possible states of affairs in relation to the actual state of affairs. But Lewis gave no formal definition of similarity in his book [1] . He defined two basic counterfactual conditional operators and one comparative possibility operator:
If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that B; • A B: If it were the case that A, then it might be the case that B; • A B: It is as possible that A as it is that B. He showed that either or can be taken as a primitive notion for counterfactuals. He used possible-world semantics for intentional logic. For that reason the state of affairs are treated as worlds. To express similarity, he used proximity notions: a world is closer to the actual world in comparison to other worlds if it is more similar to the actual world than other considered worlds. He called the set of worlds to be considered for an evaluation as the strictness of the conditional. He pointed out that the strictness of the counterfactual conditional is based on the similarity of worlds. He showed that the counterfactual could not be treated by strict conditionals, necessity operators or possibility operators given by modal logics. To do so, he argued that strictness of the conditional can not be given before all evaluations. He constructed sequences of connected counterfactuals in a single English sentence for which the strictness cannot be given for the evaluation:
"If Otto had come, it would have been a lively party; but if both Otto and Anna had come it would have been a dreary party; but if Waldo had come as well, it would have been lively; but..." to show that the strictness of the counterfactuals cannot be defined by the context, because the sentence provides a single context for the evaluation of all counterfactuals. If we try to fix a strictness that makes a counterfactual true, then the next counterfactual is made false. Lewis proposed a variably strict conditional, in which different degrees of strictness is given for every world before the evaluation of any counterfactual. To express this concept, the accessibility relation is defined by a system of spheres, which is given for every world by a nesting function $ that applies over a set of worlds W. The nested function assigns a set of non-empty sets of worlds for each world and this set of sets is totally ordered for the inclusion relation. A system of spheres, of any kind, is central in the most traditional analysis of counterfactuals. But the idea behind it is also available to many different logics. So, if we manage to handle them in a satisfactory manner, we will be able to use it in a broader class of logics. The system of spheres facilitates the development of the model, by leaving open the choice for a proper definition of similarity. From Lewis definitions, the nesting function is a primitive notion [1] φ ψ is true at a world φ ψ is true at a world i if and only if, for every sphere S in $ i , if S contains any ψ-world then S contains a φ-world.
$ i gives the spheres around the world i. They are the available strictness to evaluate counterfactuals at i. Lewis [1] provided conditions that may be applied to the nesting function $ by universal quantification over the set of worlds. To every condition corresponds a different counterfactual logic, e.g.: Normality ($(w) = ∅); Weak centering (N and ∀N ∈ $(w) : w ∈ N ); Centering ({w} ∈ $(w)). The V -logic is the most basic counterfactual logic presented by Lewis [1] , where "V" stands for variably strict conditional. If, for example, we accept the centering condition (C), then we have the V C-logic. Lewis showed in his book a chart of 26 non-equivalent V -logics that arises from the combinations of those conditions. We prefer to call the spheres as neighborhoods, because they represent better the concept of proximity, which Lewis used to express similarity. The neighborhoods provide a relative way to compare distance. The world that is contained in a neighborhood is closer to the actual world than other world that is not contained in that same neighborhood. In [10] , we presented a sequent calculus for counterfactual logic based on a Local Set Theory [3] . In this article, we defined the satisfaction relation for worlds, for sets of the worlds and for neighborhoods, where we encapsulated some quantifications that made it easier to express the operators with fewer quantifiers. But the encapsulation made the inference system to have no control of the quantifications. Here we propose a logic for Proximity-based Understanding of Conditionals, PUC-Logic for short, that take control of the quantifications with labels. Definition 1. Given a non-empty set W (considered the set of worlds), we define a nesting function $ that assigns to each world of W a set of nested sets of W. A set of nested sets is a set of sets which is totally ordered for the inclusion relation. N is called the reference neighborhood of the template. The term structure denotes a model or a template. A structure is finite if its set of worlds is finite.
Definition 3. Given a model M = W, $, V, χ , then, for any N ∈ $(χ), the template T = W, $, V, χ, N is in perspective relation to M. We represent this by M T . Given a template T = W, $, V, χ, N , then, for any w ∈ N , the model M = W, $, V, w is in perspective relation to T . We represent this by T M.
We introduce labels in our language, in order to syntactically represent quantifications:
• Neighborhood labels: Universal quantifier over neighborhoods ( ); Existential quantifier over neighborhoods ( ); Variables (capital letters) that may denote some neighborhood (N ). • World labels: Universal quantifier over worlds ( * ); Existential quantifier over worlds (•); Variables (lower case letters) that denote some world (u). connectives (∧, ∨, →, ¬); neighborhood labels ( , ); world labels ( * , •); auxiliary symbols ((, )).
We denote the set of neighborhood labels by L n and the set of world labels by L w . We denote the set of neighborhood formulas by F n and the set of world formulas by F w . We introduced two different formulas for true and false to make the sets of formulas disjoint. The formulaˆN is introduced to represent that a neighborhood contains the neighborhood N and the formula´N represent a neighborhood that is contained in N . As we can label a labeled formula, every formula has a stack of labels that represent nested labels. We call it the attribute of the formula. The top label of the stack is the index of the formula. We represent the attribute of a formula as a letter that appear to the right of the formula. If the attribute is empty, we may omit it and the formula has no index. The attribute of some formula will always be empty if the last rule, used to build the formula, is not one of the labeling rules, as in the case of ((α → α) ,• ) ∨ (γ , * ). To read a labeled formula, it is necessary to read its index firstly and then the rest of the formula. For example, (α → α) ,• should be read as: there is some world, in all neighborhoods of the considered neighborhood system, in which it is the case that α → α. We may concatenate stacks of labels and labels, using commas, to produce a stack of labels that is obtained by respecting the order of the labels in the stacks and the order of the concatenation, like α Σ,Δ , where α is a formula and Σ and Δ are stacks of labels. But we admit no nesting of attributes, which means that (α Σ ) Δ is the same as α Σ,Δ .
Definition 5. Given a stack of labels Σ, we define Σ as the stack of labels built from Σ by reversing the order of the labels in the stack. Given Σ, the size s(Σ) is its number of labels. Definition 6. Given a set of worlds W, sets of world variables and neighborhood variables, we define a variable assignment σ, that assigns a world of W to each world variable and a non-empty set of W to each neighborhood variable.
Definition 7. Given a variable assignment function σ, the relation |= of satisfaction between formulas, models and templates is given by: $, V, χ, N |= w for every template;  W, $, V, χ, N |= ⊥ 
Theorem 1. α Σ is a n-tautology iff α Σ, * , is a n-tautology.
Proof: If α Σ is a n-tautology, ∀z ∈ W, W, $, V, z |= α Σ . In particular, given a world χ ∈ W, ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : W, $, V, w |= α Σ and, by definition, W, $, V, χ |= α Σ, * , for every world of W and α Σ, * , is also a n-tautology. Conversely, if α Σ, * , is a n-tautology, then ∀N ∈ $(χ) : ∀w ∈ N : W, $, V, w |= α Σ for every choice of W , $ , V and w. So, given W , V and w, we can choose $ to be the constant function {W}. So, ∀z ∈ W, W, $, V, z |= α Σ and α Σ must also be a n-tautology.
Extract of Natural Deduction for PUC-Logic[12]
Δ, * α Σ Definition 10. Γ P UC α, iff, there is a proof Π in the PUC ND such that, Π is a derivation of α from a subset Δ ⊆ Γ. We omit the PUC label.
In [12] , we proof that each rule is sound according neighbor systems.
In [12] , the completeness follows the scheme of showing that the canonical model is a PUC-Logic model and that any formula truth in all world of the canonical PUC model is provable in PUC-Logic. In [12] , we made the proof using the Prawitz [6] strategy and removing unnecessary detours, e.g.:
Theorem 5. PUC-Logic is decidable.
In [12] , we show that PUC-Logic has the finite model property and hence it is decidable. Theorem 6. PUC-ND is complete for the Deontic CO logic.
In [13] , we made the proof following the axioms of the CO logic.
We found one natural deduction system for the counterfactuals (Bonevac [7] ). His system is designed to deal with the V W -logic, since it contains the rule of counterfactual exploitation ( E), which encapsulates the weak centering condition. His approach to define rules for the counterfactual operators provides a better intuition of the counterfactual logic. His systems is expressive enough to deal with modalities and strict conditionals. The labelling of world shifts using formulas makes it easier to capture the counterfactual mechanics. We also found the work of Sano [8] which pointed out the advantages of using the hybrid formalism for the counterfactual logic. He presented some axioms and rules for the V HC(@) -logic that extends the V -logic of Lewis. We found a sequent calculus for the V C-logic, which is proposed by Negri and Sbardolini [9] , using indexed modalities. We also found a sequent calculus for the V -logic that is given by [11] . But this system also demands modalities in the syntax. As far as we know, our deduction system is the only one dealing with Lewis systems in a general form, that is, without using modalities in the syntax. From the definitions of Lewis [1] for the counterfactual logic, we define our natural deduction system, which is proven to be sound and complete for the V -logic. The use of two types of labels (neighborhood and world labels) gave us the ability to manage different types of quantifications. The quantifications are largely used by the counterfactual operators definitions according to Lewis. That approach makes it possible to build the rules for the counterfactual operators as derived rules of the system. Another advantage of that approach is that our natural deduction system is built without the use of modalities or strict conditionals, making it easier to take benefits from the well known propositional results such as normalization. We also think that the use of a labeled N.D, was very useful for defining logical entailment in a way quite similar to the original sphere semantics provided by Lewis. Universal and existential quantifications can expressed on the labels in way that seems to be almost the same expression performed at the semantics. Since the quantifications are easily defined at the ND apparatus, the remaining aspects of the calculus go easier too. This justifies the definition of PUC-Logic as a more basic logic designed, in fact raised, to express the many conditionals and counterfactuals defined on top of Lewis approach to this kind of reasoning.
